Spring 2022

Continuity and Change of Latter-Generational Racism in the United States from 2004 - 2016

Collin Swords
cswords@rollins.edu

“Continuity and Change of Latter-Generational Racism in the United States from 2004 - 2016”

Collin Swords

Rollins College

Abstract

Does the intensity of racial attitudes among voters in the U.S. change from 2004-2016? Do attitudes of latter-generational racism like negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity impact voter's perceptions of Presidential candidates throughout 2004 - 2016? Additionally, what is the impact of race on these preferences, specifically white racial sensitivity? This thesis examines the impact of latter-generational attitudes on Republican Presidential Candidate affect over a time series of 2004 – 2016. Over time, the Republican Party is becoming more male, white, and lower income/ educated while the Democrat Party is becoming more diverse and better educated. Over time, latter generation racial attitudes positively influence Republican Presidential candidate warmness, especially in 2012 and 2016. White identity becomes an increasing influence on Republican candidate warmness, along with racial resentment and anti-black affect across the series, suggesting that the issue of race continues to be an influencing issue in the 21st century.

Keywords: Racial resentment, latter-generational racism, polarization

"Continuity and Change of Latter-Generational Racism in the United States from 2004 - 2016"

Chapter 1: Introduction

Does the intensity of racial attitudes among voters in the U.S. change from 2004-2016? Do attitudes of latter-generational racism like negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity impact voter's perceptions of Presidential candidates throughout 2004 - 2016? Additionally, what is the impact of race on these preferences, specifically white racial sensitivity?

The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act effectively ended the *de jure* style of racism within the country and put an end to socially accepted 'overt,' 'explicit,' or 'blatant' forms of racism. Political scholars Sniderman et al. (1991), Sears et al. (1997), and Virtanen and Huddy (1998) distinguish between two types of racial attitudes: (1) old-fashioned racism, which are attitudes of racial inferiority, specifically that blacks do not deserve opportunities of equality, and (2) 'new,' 'symbolic' racism, the belief that blacks are violating 'cherished values' of the American ethos and are making illegitimate demands for change (McConahay and Hough Jr., 1976). Put simply, old fashion racists believe in principles of inequality between races, or that whites belong at the top of a hierarchal structure and society ought to be segregated (1976). New racism, however, is the belief that the legacy of centuries of institutionalized racism within the US has no lasting impact on today's black citizens, meaning individuals who possess 'new' racial sensitivity believe in *stark* equality and 'color-blindness' where no racial group ought to receive special incentives over another and 'blacks should simply work harder' (Sears et al., 1997). I investigate the continuity and change of both forms of racial

attitudes from 2004-2016 to determine their influence on voter's perceptions of candidates over time.

According to the Michigan School model of voting, the funnel of causality of voting behavior demonstrates that partisan identification, then attitudes of party candidates, then group associations, and finally domestic/ foreign policy attitudes each exert influence on vote choice (Campbell et al., 1960). Assuming each level within the funnel has some degree of influence on voting behavior, and racial attitudes are an important group identity in American politics, race and racial sensitivity may affect perceptions of Presidential candidates. This research examines whether racial attitudes like stereotyping, resentment, and white identity have changed over the last 20 years and evaluates their differing effects on presidential candidate affect and warmness.

Additionally, the time series of 2004 to 2016 presents four unique candidates and historical events surrounding each election year. The presidential election of 2004 introduces the noticeable beginning of 20 years of increasing party polarization. Racial attitudes, cleavage by party, appeared uniformly split along traditional party ideals. Additionally, both candidates within this election were white. 2004 allows the research to determine if racial attitudes are still present in an election without the explicit salience of race. The election of 2008 was the first time in American history that a black man successfully won the presidential election. Barack Obama's candidacy for president immediately sparked racialized debates and the duration of Obama's first term showed increasing polarization within political parties along the lines of race (Tesler, 2016). The Republican candidate at the time explicitly avoided any negative rhetoric or policy stances on race, as Senator McCain treated Obama as his political equal. I use 2012 because Obama's reelection cycle further divided ideology along race lines as blacks grew universally more supportive of his policies while whites grew a greater disdain for anything associated with

the President. Additionally, Mitt Romney used racialized rhetoric against President Obama, such as racialized smear campaigns to excite his base. Finally, the 2016 election, specifically President Trump, featured an overwhelming amount of racialized campaign rhetoric, targeting attitudes of intergroup resentment and intragroup white status threat (Mason et al., 2021). Each election year can individually target aspects of racial identity and presents four different candidates who uniquely utilize race in different ways.

This research uses data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) to determine how different measures of contemporary racial attitudes can capture different dimensions of these attitudes among voters. Two measures of racial attitudes, explicit and implicit, and four conceptually distinct definitions of racial attitudes best explain different dimensions of these attitudes: negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity. Generally, my results show that explicit racial attitudes, specifically old-fashioned racial beliefs, have little to no impact on voter presidential preference. Modern forms of racial sensitivity such as resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity exert a significant impact on the attitudes of white respondents. Voters holding these beliefs are more likely to view the Republican candidate warmly across all years, especially attitudes of white identity in 2016 among white voters.

The major findings of this research indicate that race continues to be a deep cleavage in society and our political parties are becoming more stratified along race. Republicans are becoming more white, male, and less educated, while the Democrats continue to become more diverse and more educated. Additionally, this research concludes that racial attitudes are, on balance, always present and influential in U.S. politics in the 21st century. This means that any ambitious politician can weaponize and activate these attitudes for their benefit at any time.

Polarization and the new forms of racial attitudes I measure reached a peak in 2012, an election where race was exceptionally salient. The mirroring intensities between polarization and racial attitudes over time suggests a potential correlation between the two, indicating that American polarization extends beyond party politics and is fueled by racial cleavages.

The issue of race is ingrained into the American political system and the legacy effects of racial injustice remain apparent throughout American democracy. Even though the United States may have entered a ‘color-blind’ era of policymaking half a century ago, the lingering socialization and political power of racialized attitudes remains present. The continued polarization in party politics has gotten worse and the United States is in a fragile spot, economically, socially, and politically. A critical focus on the influence of these attitudes and the different dimensions of them throughout society could benefit the outdated ways policy makers discuss and view racially disparate impacts of policy.

Chapter 2: Race, Racism, and Voting in America

This chapter examines the differences between old-fashioned and new definitions of racism in the U.S, including distinctions made between different versions of 'new' racism and their theoretical underpinnings to better understand how their influence changes over time. Second, it defines the two pathways all racial attitudes are expressed post-1950s American society: explicitly and implicitly.

Section 2.1: Old-fashioned Racism versus New, Symbolic Racism

The term 'old-fashioned racism,' used by Virtanen and Huddy (1998), refers to blatant racism and accurately describes the era of Jim Crow Laws, Black Codes, and other *de jure* forms of discrimination against people of color. This type of racism is motivated by presumptions of African racial inferiority and open support for segregation and discrimination (Sniderman et al., 1991; Sears et al., 1997). These feelings are what political scientists originally used to measure racist attitudes because these attitudes were explicit and socially acceptable (Virtanen and Huddy, 1998). Since the '50s, these attitudes are increasingly unacceptable in society, as shown through public opinion data on race equality gathered by the University of Illinois, represented in Figure 1 below (Krysan and Moberg, 2021). As a result, old-fashioned racial attitudes in America no longer have considerable effects on politics (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986). White Americans now believe in an egalitarian approach to politics, favoring policies and discourse that support equality between races (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears, 1993).

Figure 1

Support for the Principle of Equality in Schools



NOTE: from Krysan, M., & Moberg, S. "*Tracking trends in racial attitudes*," April 2021, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois System, retrieved from https://igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/racial_attitudes_2021.

This does not mean, however, that racist attitudes are gone. Kinder and Sears (1981) agree that sociocultural learning, an ongoing process of child/ adolescent socialization that instills certain normative attitudes of society into the individual (Kinder and Sears, 1981), reinforces centuries of widespread negative attitudes towards African Americans (Sears et al., 1997). Because sociocultural learning in an American context carries these historical overtones, they contend that the presence of racial prejudice in the United States is still an attitude that carries significant political power, even if it's not expressed through old-fashioned means (1997).

Symbolic racism is theoretically grounded in symbolic political theory. As operationalized by Sears, symbolic political theory argues that humans have strong,

individualized attitudinal dispositions which can be evoked by specific political symbols (1993). Racial dispositions within whites, Sears assumes, are the easiest to activate and subsequently study within America because of the 200-year history of white supremacy in the United States (Sears et al., 1997). The forms these political symbols take vary between candidate, political party, and historical setting of the election, however, Sears discovers that the racial attitudes these symbols activate are not individualistic nor discriminatory. Simply, racialized political symbols tap into an ever-present backdrop of racialized attitudes rather than individual, specific attitudes that are unique to each respondent (Sears, 1993).

There is an ever-growing list of 'new' racism conceptualizations. Generally, 'symbolic' racism is the popular term and assumes that covert racism, and the implicit ways to express those attitudes, is the form that carries the most political power (Sniderman et al., 1991). Symbolic racism is the expression of whites' racial attitudes that blacks are violating 'cherished values' of the American (Protestant-dominated) ethos and are making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo (McConahay and Hough Jr., 1976). McConahay and Hough argue that symbolic racism activates racial attitudes that are independent of extraneous variables such as income, tolerance, occupation, self-concept, etc. (1976) and was developed through 200 years of anti-black socialization within American society, further supporting Kinder and Sears' sociocultural learning hypothesis (1981).

Sears et al. offer a three-part definition for symbolic racism. They define it as a societal paradigm that is a conglomeration of multiple societal attitudes that are remnants of America's historical struggle with race (Sears et al., 1997). The first classification requires symbolic racism to be expressed in terms that are abstract and ideological because it reflects whites' perception of

how society *ought* to be organized. The second classification concerns the content of the term and is explained through three principles:

1. Racial discrimination is a thing of the past
2. Blacks should just work harder to overcome their disadvantages
3. Blacks are making excessive demands for special treatment and get too much attention from elites, so their gains are often undeserved (Sears et al., p. 22, 1997)

The final classification of symbolic racism ascribes the origins of these attitudes to be from a blend of antiblack affect with the perception that blacks violate traditional American values.

Building from this conceptualization, what is the best way to operationalize symbolic racism? To accurately measure symbolic racism, Kinder and Sanders created a racial resentment scale that ranks the responses of respondents across a four-battery question administered in public surveys. The four questions are:

1. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people just not trying hard enough: if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Cramer, 2020)

There are no questions about segregationist attitudes or any old-fashioned racist ideologies, rather, the use of racialized ‘symbolic’ language in the questions is meant to measure symbolic racism along a scale of ‘racial resentment.’ By using these conceptualizations of symbolic racism

and racial resentment, the methods and tools political scientists use to measure racial attitudes have adapted to more implicit measures, rather than explicit.

An issue within the literature on symbolic racism is the vast amount of language used to convey similar ideas. To streamline the rhetoric used in this thesis, I use the term "Latter-generational Racism" (LGR) to encompass all variations of 'new' racism in the United States using traditional conceptualizations of symbolic racism. The term "latter-generational" distinguishes between 'old-fashioned' racism and new racism which transitioned within one generation (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986). LGR is not a measure of racial attitudes but it is a broad term I use to describe the different ways in which symbolic racism, racial resentment, and other variations of 'new' racism present themselves in society. This definition of LGR also includes the political mechanisms and manifestations of symbolic racism in America.

Section 2.1.1: Explicit Vs. Implicit Racial Attitudes

Explicit

Explicit racial attitudes are negative attitudes that elicit an obvious violation of egalitarian social policy along the cleavage of race (Peffley et al., 1997). According to Axt, explicit racial attitudes are usually measured through racial rhetoric responses to survey questions such as "Would you shake hands with a Negro?" (2018) Explicit measures are often associated with old-fashioned racism since it was socially acceptable to outright support segregation before the 1960s. These questions, when asked, pose a risk of 'outing' a racist because any response that does not support equality or egalitarianism would be perceived as socially unacceptable. Ismail White in "When Race Matters and When It Doesn't" (2007) questions the role of implicit and explicit bias through the lens of white and black "in-groups" to see what activates racial attitudes

in each group. He does this through targeting policy positions of whites and blacks on non-racial issues, such as the Iraq War, and racializes certain groups to understand the effect of explicit cues. White identifies that explicit, negatively black-coded language does *not* elicit a racial response within whites and that the data was insignificant. He attributes this to the 'social undesirability effect' and argues that the unwanted social attention of being labeled as racist stops respondents from truthfully answering surveys (White, 2007).

Implicit

Implicit racism is measured through racially codified rhetoric as opposed to racially explicit rhetoric. Racially codified rhetoric is a distinct feature of implicit racial attitudes. Using Kinder and Sears's conceptualization of racial resentment, the four-question battery they use to measure racial resentment are statements that both indirectly measure race and directly measure an alternative American ethos (1981). Their four-question battery implicitly measures attitudes of race through phrasing questions to explicitly measure individualism, which circumvents the social undesirability effect and allows respondents to answer truthfully. Symbolic racism scholars agree that on average, implicit measures are better equipped to measure the political impact of racial attitudes than traditional explicit measures (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 1997); due to this, special emphasis is placed on implicit measures of racial attitudes in the research.

Section 2.2: Socio-psychological Approach to Voting Behavior

This section outlines a major theory of voting that supports the groundwork of my research: the Michigan School of socio-psychological vote choice; additionally, this section applies the Michigan model to race and racial attitudes. Originally published by Campbell et al. in 1960, the Michigan School argues that an individual's vote choice is largely predetermined by socio-demographic factors and partisan identification, which act as lenses through which voters form preferences and attitudes on policy and candidate positions (Campbell et al., 1960). According to their model, the 'funnel of causality,' four distinct sections act in a causal chain of a funnel, where each previous section influences the next, leading to a final vote choice (Campbell et al., 1960), as seen in Figure 2. Each of the four sections of the funnel acts in tandem through time to establish a model of vote choice that is inclusive of both sociological and psychological factors of the individual.

Figure 2

Funnel of Causality, Michigan School



NOTE: From Campbell, Angus, et al. *The American Voter*. John Wiley, 1960.

1. Socio-Demographics

Social demographics refer to groups constructed along social cleavages such as race, gender, income, education, religion, etc., and can be fixed or changing (Campbell et al., 1960). Fixed identities of race and gender, for example, are identities assigned at birth and have an immediate and lasting impact on the way individuals perceive the world (Tajfel and Turner, 2004). Because of this, social demographics are the first 'lens' through which individuals view the choice to vote (Campbell et al., 1960). These demographics are often long-term identities, meaning they may have significant impact over time due to their unchanging nature. Socio-demographics will often outlive political party affiliation and policy preferences as those attitudes may change in each election.

Identity politics is how an individual perceives themselves in in-group and out-group contexts. Identity is central to the ways individuals operate within society and identity politics specifically focuses on how individuals within different groups perceive, react, and respond to political events such as elections or policymaking. Tajfel and Turner use two scales to operationalize their continuum of group identity: "interpersonal-intergroup behavior" (Tajfel and Turner, 2004, p. 277) and "social mobility-social change" (Tajfel and Turner, 2004, p. 278). At one end of the "interpersonal-intergroup" continuum is interpersonal behavior, or social interactions between people that have no regard for group identities and communicate interpersonally (2004). The more an individual uses group identity to create their own individual identity and present themselves as an individual 'group member' within society represents the other end of the continuum, "intergroup behavior" (2004). The second continuum is the scale of 'social mobility' and 'social change.' If an individual believes that the social group/ society they live in is permeable and flexible, they also believe that through individual efforts, be it luck or

hard work, they can change their social group identity to something that better reflects their interest (2004). Social mobility's counterpart, 'social change,' implies that society is rigidly organized around social groups, and any attempt of an individual to change their individual group identification is extremely difficult, if not impossible (2004).

By organizing influencing behaviors of socio-demographic identity along a continuum, Tajfel and Turner create a method of categorization for social group identity that can explain the complex roles group identities can play on political behavior. I include their conceptualization of group identities and identity politics because socio-demographic identities such as race and gender create fixed lenses that influence political opinion over time and help explain why attitudes regarding race and LGR might influence perceptions of Presidential candidates (Campbell et al., 1960).

2. Party Identification

Partisan identification is a strong indicator of vote choice and has grown stronger throughout the years (Campbell et al., 1960). Partisan identification is a form of group identity that occurs because of socialization, such as the type of education received, demographics, societal conditions, and more (Kinder and Sears, 1981) and carries a significant impact on the decision to vote. Voters utilize their party affiliation to act as a cognitive heuristic, or shortcut, to participation in democratic institutions; voters trust political parties to nominate and vet candidates who will serve the public, saving time in the process (Campbell et al., 1960). Although party identification is an important individual influence on vote choice, it's a relatively unchanging identity that can last for decades. A citizen's vote may not always be for their identified political party and may change from year to year, however, the circumstances

motivating a temporary flip in partisan vote choice are often not enough to influence a complete abandonment of a citizen's registered political party (Campbell et al., 1960).

3. Issues

This section of the funnel has a more direct impact on vote choice than the previous two and concerns individual's position on issues, policies, and group identity loyalty (Campbell et al., 1960). A voter's stances on domestic and foreign issues have a significant effect on vote choice, following partisan identification and socio-demographic variables (Campbell et al., 1960). Voter's stances on issues also affect perceptions of candidates both within and outside party lines. If a voter carries strong attitudinal positions about an issue, they are more likely to select a candidate that supports their beliefs over partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960). Race relations, for example, is an issue that bleeds into multiple democratic institutions, such as legislation, executive campaigns/ administrations, and even elections themselves. The act of 'racial spillover' is the process of racialized attitudes influencing voter preferences towards race-neutral policy conceptualized by Michael Tesler (2016).

Tesler argues in his book "Post-Racial or Most-Racial?" that symbolic racism became salient not only through the lingering effects of America's racially charged past but through the perception of race relations in America. By analyzing the 2008 election of President Obama, Tesler discovers that the polarization of the nation's electorate following the election of President Obama permeated beyond the presidential election itself and racial attitudes were used to judge President Obama's officials and policy decisions (2016).

In further research done by Tesler, President Obama's association with healthcare racialized public opinion surrounding health care (2010). As Obamacare became increasingly discussed in the political sphere, a growing number of white Americans began to resent policy

language that explicitly mentioned President Obama compared to non-racially charged "Democrats" (2012). The effects of using President Obama's name activated racial attitudes within respondents and created a "spillover effect" of racialization (Tesler, 2012) that resulted in some Americans believing Obamacare was predisposed to helping blacks over whites, despite an all-around lack of government-subsidized health care prior to his legislation (Tesler, 2012).

4. Candidates and Election Media

The final influence on vote choice within the Michigan school is the campaign and media surrounding candidates and issues (Campbell et al., 1960). Influenced by all previous sections of the funnel, this section captures candidate-specific attitudes and argues that these are the closest and most direct influences on vote choice because of their impermanent nature (1960). The circumstances regarding elections change every time, and as such, these attitudes are more directly associated to vote choice because they are created most recently (1960). This section also captures candidate exceptionalism, the idea that candidates and their behaviors/ rhetoric have a unique effect on traditional voting trends and creates more votes for their party. The presidential elections of 2004 to 2016 all contain unique candidates that each weaponized or dismantled the problem of race in a way never previously seen in American presidential politics.

Election media is the way candidates support themselves and their platform using television ads, soundbites, or other media streams. Media and campaigns have a strong effect on national discourse towards political candidates and policy issues because they control the narrative of the election. Presidential candidate Trump's effective takeover of TV news and social media throughout the campaign season provided a substantial benefit to the Trump campaign and is credited to be one of the influential factors in the 2016 election results (Sides et al., 2016). The

Michigan School model of vote choice offers a socio-psychological approach to vote choice and is the best fit model for understanding the effect of racial attitudes on presidential candidate perceptions in contemporary U.S. politics.

Section 2.3: Exploring Activation Mechanisms of Racial Attitudes

This section investigates mechanisms that activate racial attitudes in the electorate that influence presidential candidate perceptions. Understanding that new, symbolic racial attitudes potentially influence multiple liberal institutions, including vote choice, what mechanisms activate these attitudes? How are they defined, who uses them the most, and which have the highest impact in politics? There are four dimensions of LGR that are shown to have the highest chance of activating voters' attitudes: negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity.

1. Negative Stereotypes

Stereotypes are commonly held beliefs about groups of people. Stereotypes, in this definition, are not necessarily helpful or harmful nor do they necessarily hold any truth. Conceptualized by Block in a similar fashion, racial stereotypes are "the widely shared perceptions that people have about certain social groups and the individuals who are members of those groups" (Block, 2019).

Because stereotypes are widespread among populations, they can have a far-reaching effect in politics. For example, negative stereotypes have been activated in the past to shape public opinion about social welfare programs. Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman examine the extent to which race biases affect whites' political judgment towards black welfare recipients through a statistical analysis of phone surveys (CATI) (Peffley et al., 1997). Their research

examines how two groups of white Americans react to affirming and dissenting stereotypes, one that endorses negative stereotypes and one that rejects them. The two stereotypes the researchers 'activated' for their experiment were "Black Work Ethic" (the view that blacks, as a group, are lazy and lack discipline) and "Black Hostility," or the perceived aggression of blacks as a group (1997). The stereotypes that Peffley et al. examine use similar language that Sears et al. use to conceptualize symbolic racism. In this sense, Peffley et al. choose to focus on negative stereotypes that are the most prevalent in American society, rather than focus on 'old-fashion' segregationist attitudes that have little political impact (1997).

Their "Welfare Mother" experiment is designed to test the question: how do whites that accept/ reject negative stereotypes respond to hypothetical classifications of a mother on welfare? By asking respondents questions about a hypothetical mother on welfare who is classified by different races and education levels, researchers discover that those with negative characterizations of blacks judge black targets more harshly than white targets, while those who reject negative characterizations of blacks tend to judge blacks more positively than they judge whites (Peffley et al., 1997, p. 42) White respondents 'doubled-down' on their negative stereotypes towards poor blacks when presented with confirming information in the experiment. However, the unchanged attitudes toward poor whites that possess negative characteristics demonstrate that negative stereotyping is influenced predominately by race, rather than individual actions (1997).

2. Racial Resentment

Racial resentment, conceptualized and operationalized by Kinder and Sanders, is a metric of evaluation used to identify respondents' levels using a 4-battery question to capture implicit attitudes of racial resentment without explicitly violating the creed of egalitarianism. This is a

very important dimension of LGR because racial resentment has been uniformly studied for over 40 years and will serve as a benchmark for the political influence of "new" racism. Attitudes of racial resentment tap into dimensions of rugged individualism, perceived violations of American work ethic, and an assessment on the belief that the only barrier to success is work ethic. This is done intentionally to offer respondents alternative theoretical justifications for perceived racial attitudes, preserving the societal norm of egalitarianism (Kinder and Sears, 1981).

A distinction offered by scholars Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo in their work *Racialized Politics* that is conceptually tied to LGR is the notion of individualism and prejudice within American society. The culture of individualism is prevalent throughout all societal proceedings within America and is often used by individual citizens as a mechanism to reinforce the value of individual labor over the systems within which the individual operates.

American Individualism and Structural Injustice presents a compelling argument that the ideology of American individualism blinds the individualist from perceiving institutional injustice altogether (Turner, 2008). The individualist, believing a person's problems are the sole effect of the individual, blocks themselves from viewing the 'larger picture' of society that actively created the environment within which individual decisions are made (2008). The lack of societal accountability felt by the individualist not only gives them justification for other people's problems, such as "they didn't work hard enough," it gives the individualist a sense of non-dependence of others, allowing them to feel separate from other's problems, and subsequently not feel responsible to fix it (2008). Using these attitudes as deflectors allow respondents to avoid explicitly stating racial preferences and will be used in the research as an accurate and time-tested model of LGR measures.

3. Anti-black Affect

Anti-black affect is an attitudinal dimension of LGR that bases beliefs on tenants created by over 200 years of negative attitudes and stereotypes towards blacks (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Anti-black affect is the belief among whites that blacks, as a group, violate cherished American ethos of work, and because of that, their demands for racial equality are unfounded, and any governmental assistance is undeserved (McConahay and Hough, 1976). Anti-black affect is hard to conceptually pin down, however, survey questions that measure explicit or implicit racial attitudes can target anti-black affect to measure its effects on politics. For example, an ANES question targeting anti-black affect is: "Which statement do you agree with the most? Blacks have _____ influence in politics (too much/ just enough/ too little)" (ANES, 2016). Answers indicating that blacks have *too much* influence in politics indicate higher attitudes of anti-black affect.

4. White Identity Politics

Under Tajfel and Turner's (2004) operationalization of identity politics, the way race is viewed as an identity within America is both an in-group and out-group identity that is fixed and unchanging. Because of this, individualist attitudes that influence racial identity are conceptualized as "intergroup- 'social change'" (Tajfel and Turner, 2004). The unchanging nature of racial identity creates distinct sentiments at an intragroup level that influences how groups organized along racial identities perceive outside groups.

Within the context of race in America, identity politics that develop along racial attitudes are present in every racialized group of Americans: minority or white (Knowles and Marshburn, 2010). However, the presence of white identity politics is often overlooked. White identity

politics, defined by Knowles and Marshburn, is the way in which whites, consciously or unconsciously, use their race to reinforce the hegemonic structure of whiteness within society without explicitly violating societal codes of egalitarianism and color-blindness (2010). Under this definition, white identity politics is best understood to be an intragroup response to individualistic sentiments of "intergroup-social change" (Tajfel and Turner, 2004).

Jardina's focus in *White Identity Politics* is making the claim that the newfound niche of 'white identity' in America is born from grievances of whites (Jardina, 2019), specifically the feeling of power deconsolidation amidst a changing demographic of electorates and 'white oppression' (2019). Whites, following the 2008 and 2016 elections, believe in two rhetorically opposed stances of America's race relations: we are now a post-racial society that is inherently colorblind with no legal barriers to success (Tesler, 2010), and the status of whites is being threatened by ever-increasing immigration and minority population (Jovita, 2019). Her findings indicate no relationship between whites' out-group grievances for others and in-group racial identification (Jovita, 2019). Essentially, the intragroup racial identification among whites is not necessarily created out of intergroup conflict, rather, her findings align with Tajfel and Turner's findings of social identity politics that ingroup sentiments play a significant role in identity formation. The sentiments shared in-group by whites are the focus of Jovita's *White Identity Politics* and the shared sense of community and solidarity of in-group grievances is a strong indicator of how whites carry themselves within the social and political spheres (2019).

The gradual increase of race-based identity politics is indicative of lingering grievances and racial resentment described by previous scholars; however, its effects are still being discussed long-term. Sides et al. focus on tangible measurements of racial resentment and activated racial identity in "Identity Crisis" (2018) by exploring the attitudes activated by the

Trump campaign in 2016. President Trump was able to activate racial attitudes within whites because of the shared grievances of feeling ‘left out’ or ‘cheated’ by government social welfare programs that become synonymous with ‘underserving’ Americans (Sides et al., 2018). Survey data indicates that economic scarcity, independent of racialized language, had little to no effect on activating racial attitudes in whites (2018), nor did it correlate with an increased vote share for President Trump. In addition, whites that believe their economic and cultural superiority is dwindling overwhelmingly supported Trump in the 2016 election, suggesting that intragroup attitudes of whites are racially motivated, rather than motivated through purely economic competition.

The findings of “Identity Crisis” are all in agreement that racial attitudes of intragroup whites, specifically attitudes about out-group immigration and racial inequality, significantly influenced the results of the 2016 presidential election. Although President Trump represented a unique case insofar as his ability to activate racial attitudes more so than candidate/ partisan attitudes, the findings of Sides et al. indicate that white identity politics have continued to play an increasing role in presidential elections since the election of President Obama in 2008 and could potentially influence the results of future elections.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods

Does the intensity of racial attitudes among voters in the U.S. change from 2004 - 2016? Additionally, what is the impact of race on these attitudes, specifically white racial sensitivity? Do attitudes of latter-generational racism like negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity impact voters' perceptions of Presidential candidates throughout 2004 - 2016? Using ANES data, I expect to find that the intensity of racial attitudes among U.S. voters has increased over the past 20 years due to the salience of race following the election of Presidents Obama and President Trump in 2008/ 2016, respectively. Additionally, I expect that all dimensions of latter-generational racism influence the perceptions of Presidential candidates among voters. Specifically, I argue that intensities of LGR will cause a voter to view the Republican presidential candidate more warmly (or closer) over time because of the tools utilized by the party to elicit racial cues (Mason et al., 2021). When considering the effect of being white and racial attitudes, I expect that LGR attitudes are strongest among white voters across time, especially during the Obama Administration, because of perceived feelings of status threat along racial lines (Tesler, 2016).

The beginning of the 2000s in America was heavily dominated by foreign policy and international concerns about terrorism following 9/11, and as such, domestic issues of racial justice were not necessarily nationwide concerns. The levels of racial attitudes, according to Pew Research Center, remained consistent throughout the 90s and early 2000s (N.W. et al., 2003), changing with Barrack Obama announcing his candidacy. Within the past 30 years, the Democratic party has become associated with minorities and their interests, and because of this, I

expect to find that those possessing higher intensities of LGR will view the Republican candidate more positively compared to the Democrat opponent (Brown, 2004).

Recently, the alienation effect experienced by whites during historical moments of racial progress (Gilens, 2009; Tesler, 2012, 2016) should drive white voters away from the Democratic party and towards the Republicans. The effects of intragroup white identity should have more of an impact on perceptions of presidential candidates over time because presidential candidates, specifically from the Republican party, increasingly activated these attitudes over time. There is extensive research done by multiple political scientists indicating that the most significant activation of racial attitudes, positive or negative, occurs within whites more so than any other racially classified group (White, 2007; Peffley et al., 1997; Sears et al., 1997). Because of this, this project will focus on the attitudes of whites, in addition to the entire electorate, when analyzing the relationship between LGR variables and vote choice, expecting these results to be the most statistically significant.

The following section begins with the methodology of the time series analysis. The next subsection examines each election year in the time series, including campaign and candidate particularities and unique circumstances that could have influenced the activation of racial attitudes. Finally, I discuss variable operationalization and the ANES data set.

Section 3.1: Methodology

I examine change in indicators of latter generation racism over a 20-year period using the American National Election Studies from 2004 through 2016. First, I report white and non-white voting trends, controlling for standard demographic factors such as income, education, and gender, to better understand the general voting patterns during this time. I expect to find that, in

general, whites over the past 20 years have become more Republican while non-whites have remained Democratic. I expect this because Republicans, on balance, began the 2000s emphasizing traditional conservative appeals of small governance and equality of opportunity for all, as demonstrated by Senator McCain's platform in 2008 (N.W. et al., 2018). Republican positions on racial policy shifted slightly around 2012 as presidential candidate Mitt Romney used negative racial stereotypes against President Obama on the campaign trail with slogans such as "Obama's Not Working" (McIlwain and Caliendo, 2014). Further, Republican state lawmakers began to introduce strict voter identification laws following the decision of *Shelby County V. Holder*, the effects of which have been demonstrated to have a disparate negative impact on minority communities (Stephanopoulos, 2014). Democrats, on the other hand, embodied the increasingly diverse electorate and utilized grassroots mobilization efforts during the first Obama campaign to specifically target minority populations (Nelson, 2016). In short, the political parties have become more demographically separated over the last 20 years.

Next, I examine attitudes of racial in-group and out-group affect among whites and blacks by measuring group feeling thermometers across four years to examine if there is a growing divide between intra/intergroup race relations. I expect to find that both attitudes among blacks are consistently warmer than whites due to the cultural identity of blackness in the U.S. being a very strong factor that shapes political opinion (Campbell et al., 1960; Kendi, 2016). In fact, I expect white's intergroup feelings toward blacks to grow colder throughout the years, especially in 2016 due to President Trump's campaign.

I additionally evaluate trends of polarization through a comparison of the average (mean) of Presidential candidate feeling thermometers to discover if there is any potential overlap in disparities of intergroup racial warmness and feelings of polarization. Especially in the time of

Obama and Trump, racial attitudes may have a significant influence on growing polarization trends between political parties. If this is the case, I expect indicators of high polarization and low intergroup warmness among whites/ blacks to mirror intensities across the 4 election cycles. By using the measure of presidential candidate warmness, these trends include candidate influence and streamline the research towards the regression models.

To measure significance, I employ one-tailed two-sample t-tests on the means of presidential candidate warmness across respondents' party affiliation over the time series. I expect to find that like the attitudes of whites, polarization of both party's constituents will rise throughout the years and peak in 2016, caused by increasing social cleavages, campaign and elite rhetoric, and a failure to compromise within Congress (Sides et al., 2018). The final subsection of the descriptive results compares the means of four independent LGR index variables across the time series to examine the continuity and change of these attitudes.

However, simple means comparison analysis are not sufficient to understand the impact of LGR attitudes on presidential candidate preferences. Accordingly, I estimate three different multivariate regression models of the four independent LGR measures against Presidential candidate feeling thermometers of both dominant political parties in chapter 5. Using two different models, one controlling for white respondents only and the other for the entire sample, I expect to find that LGR attitudes and measures among white respondents alone are stronger because most of the LGR variables utilize implicit measures which specifically activate white racial sensitivity (White, 2007). The final model regresses chosen interaction variables measuring the impact of both being white and having activated LGR attitudes as a final examination of both the impact of race and racial attitudes on presidential candidate preferences.

Section 3.2: Election Cases

A 20-year time series enables the discovery of possible trends or changes in measures of racism. Second, it is important to understand the unique nuances of each election to better understand how latter-generational racial attitudes potentially played a role in each.

1. The Election of 2004

The presidential election of 2004 introduces the noticeable beginning of roughly 20 years of increasing party polarization and constitutional hardball surrounding policy and decision-making. The election was between incumbent President George W. Bush and Democratic candidate John Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts. I selected this election to begin my time series for three reasons: partisan-led racial attitude 'stability,' the whiteness of both candidates, and the presence of polarization.

The partisan gap along the cleavage of race, according to Pew Research Center, was at the same levels in 2004 as in the 1980s, demonstrating that although the difference in racial opinion along party lines was stark, it had not significantly changed in two decades (NW et al., 2003). According to data in 2003, race was still a side-bar issue in comparison to discussions of national security following 9/11 and the Iraq War. Because of this, I have selected 2004 because it will serve as a non-exceptional case for my analysis due to the relatively unchanging nature of racial attitudes from the 1980s to 2000s (NW et al., 2003).

Additionally, both candidates in this election were white. The lack of attention garnered to both presidential candidates due to the status quo of the president being white allows investigation into a time before the influence of President Obama and his race were commonplace in American discourse. The Democrats opted to be silent on the issues of race

during this time while Republicans were adamant about their continual adoption of racialized positions such as the War on Terror, both abroad and at home (Wing, 2012). This essentially allowed the Democrats to remain egalitarian-oriented in their social policy decisions while Republicans became the party against racial 'equity.' This, in turn, resulted in racial policy remaining in the background of larger issues.

2. The Election of 2008

The election of 2008 was the first time in American history that a black man successfully won the democratic primary nomination and became the front runner in a presidential election. Barack Obama's candidacy for president immediately sparked debates that were rooted in racial attitudes as whites didn't necessarily know if a black man in the White House would look out for their interests. Obama's campaign was forced to tirelessly navigate through socialized anti-black effect and increasing racial spillover, all while still trying to appeal to the attributes of a "stereotypically positive" black man (Tesler, 2016). Throughout his term, President Obama would remain diligently neutral on issues of race, even going as far as to denounce claims of racial prejudice against him on issues such as health care (2016).

Despite his best efforts, the American public over time came to view everything under his presidency through the lens of race (Tesler, 2012). This process of racialization, or analyzing political issues and candidates through a racialized lens, continued beyond President Obama's campaign well into his presidency as the American public specifically viewed issues such as health care to be racially motivated (Tesler, 2012). As Obamacare became increasingly discussed in the political sphere, Tesler documents a growing number of Americans that began to resent policy language that explicitly mentioned President Obama compared to non-racially charged

"democrats" (2012). The effects of using President Obama's name activated racial attitudes within respondents and created a "spillover effect" of racialization (Tesler, 2012) that resulted in Americans believing Obamacare was predisposed to helping blacks over whites, despite an all-around lack of government-subsidized health care prior to his legislation (Tesler, 2012).

3. The election of 2012

In 2012, President Obama only received 39% of white vote share (Tesler, 2016), he experienced a divided Congress along partisan beliefs, and the effects of racialization extended beyond his reelection (2016). The effect of racial attitudes at this point only seems to be increasingly pervasive in American political decision making and the election of 2012 is useful because Obama's reelection cycle further divided ideology along race lines as blacks grew universally more supportive of his policies while some whites grew a greater disdain for anything associated with the President.

Compared to Obama, who focused his immigration stance on offering Dreamers and undocumented children already in the US a pathway to citizenship, Romney focused on institutional reform of the naturalization process, such as citizenship through military service and opening pathways to streamline legal citizenship (Schor, 2021). It could be possible that his immigration stance was perceived through an emotionally charged lens that stoked feelings of status threat among white voters due to their preconceived feelings of animus towards specialized government programs benefiting "others" (Hochschild, 2016).

4. The election of 2016

The election of 2016 was rife with racially charged elite rhetoric, dog whistles calling for support of white supremacist ideals, and a general disdain for demographics whites would generally consider as "others" (Mason et al., 2021). Political researchers Sides et al. and Mason et al. discovered that President Trump's support in the 2016 election was predicted by voter-held attitudes of racial animus against Democrat-oriented minority groups, specifically blacks and Muslims (Sides et al., 2018; Mason et al., 2021). This was due, in part, to the rhetoric and campaign strategy employed by the Trump campaign, which actively targeted areas of rural whites throughout the United States to activate feelings of racial animus and potential status threat to elicit emotional responses (Hochschild, 2016). The animus Trump was able to use to secure the election resonated on all sides of the political aisle (Mason et al., 2021) and because of this, I use the 2016 election as an example of a political action intended to be a racially motivated backlash. If the hypotheses are true, then the 2016 post-election public opinion on negative racial attitudes should demonstrate a more significant impact on presidential preference than in 2004.

Section 3.3: Data and Operationalization of Variables

To test my research question using the ANES datasets from 2004 to 2016, key terms ought to be defined and operationalized. I use Latter-generational racism (LGR) to encompass all iterations of "new" racism, i.e. symbolic racism, racial resentment, modern racism, etc. In addition, the use of the term also encompasses the mechanisms used to activate racial attitudes such as negative stereotyping, symbolic politics, spillover of racialization, and white identity politics.

There is extensive research indicating that the most significant activation of racial attitudes, positive or negative, occurs among whites more so than in any other racially classified group (White, 2007; Peffley et al., 1997; Sears et al., 1997). Ismail White concludes that whites disproportionately react with stronger racialized attitudes when presented with implicit negative stereotypes about other races (2007). Racialized rhetoric through stereotyping does not necessarily cause minority groups to lose their racial ambivalence towards policy opinion, however.

To test the influence of racial attitudes on respondents' perceptions of presidential candidates, I use four dimensions of LGR: negative stereotypes, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity. Each is a concept of LGR attitudes that target four specific dimensions, respectively: explicit and overt attitudes, rugged individualism/ violation of American Creeds, and intragroup identities through status threat.

I select negative racial stereotypes as my first measure of LGR attitudes because it uses explicit measures, meaning it clues in respondents that the question specifically focuses on race. Using negative stereotypes as an operationalized concept taps into the dimensions of explicit and overt racial attitudes and allows the thesis to measure the effects of 'old-fashioned' racial attitudes in contemporary American society. I construct index variables from two survey questions measuring white respondents' ratings of blacks' perceived intelligence, work ethic, and hospitability as a group.[1] Responses are coded where higher values indicate higher degrees of negative stereotyping among respondents.

Racial resentment, conceptualized and operationalized by Kinder and Sanders, is a metric that identifies respondents' levels of symbolic racism using a 4-battery question set[2] that uses racially symbolic rhetoric to capture implicit attitudes of racial resentment without explicitly

violating the creed of egalitarianism. An index variable is constructed where higher values indicate higher levels of racial resentment. It is vital to include racial resentment because implicit racial sensitivity has been studied in this way for over 40 years and will serve as a benchmark for the political influence of "new" racism. Attitudes of racial resentment tap into dimensions of rugged individualism, perceived violations of American work ethic, and an assessment of the belief that the only barrier to success is work ethic, all of which serve as ideological deflectors that allow respondents to truthfully respond to racially codified survey questions without explicitly violating egalitarian racial norms (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). As with negative stereotypes, I expect racial resentment attitudes to wield positive, significant influence on Presidential candidate preferences.

Anti-black affect is best defined as general negative attitudes towards blacks that can take on multiple forms and dimensions. The final measure I use is anti-black affect expressed through white identity politics[3]. Studying the intensities of anti-black affect/ white identity is best accomplished through a comprehensive approach that touches on three different attitudes: whites' perceptions about black influence in politics, whites' perceptions of white discrimination (2012-2016), and whites' attitudes towards government-subsidized specialized assistance to blacks. Each individual variable taps into two distinct concepts of anti-black affect: general perceptions of blacks as a group and the plight of black excellence. This final dimension targets the feeling of status threat that racially sensitive whites experience with the ever-increasing presence of black influence in politics. Each variable being operationalized will have the corresponding ANES variable name reported in Table V[4]. Each variable is separated by year of dataset and the type of dimension being targeted.

Chapter 4: Preliminary Results

Generally, the Republican and Democrat parties are diverging across demographics. The Republican party is becoming more white, less educated, and male, in addition to ceding its majority to independent parties. Democrats are becoming more diverse, well-educated, and surprisingly, wealthier over time, while maintaining a similar vote share throughout the series. Whites are becoming more despondent towards presidential election candidates over time, supporting the growing independent party share. What's most surprising is that out-group warmness of both blacks and whites has *decreased* over time, while in-group warmness has remained constant. The salience of race has increased in tandem with trends of polarization as out-group presidential candidate affect within both political parties has continually declined, with its lowest in 2016. Finally, all measures of LGR are present in each election among whites in varying intensities, suggesting that white racialized attitudes can be activated whenever an ambitious candidate chooses.

Section 4.1: Demographic Trends of Vote Choice

This section describes general trends of vote choice across race, education, gender, and income between 2004-2016. Tables 1 and 2 report white and non-white vote choice from 2004-2016. For these tables, non-white includes all demographics, including Blacks, Latinos, Asians, etc.

Table 1

White Vote Choice for President, by %

	White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, by %			
	2004	**2008**	**2012**	**2016**
Democrat	40.49	44	42.46	40.06
Republican	58.03	53.87	54.32	52.6
Other	1.475	2.125	3.22	7.339

Table 2

Non-White Vote Choice for President, by %

	Non-White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, by %			
	2004	**2008**	**2012**	**2016**
Democrat	70.79	88.58	82.68	74.63
Republican	27.72	10.62	15.45	18.77
Other	1.485	<1%	1.871	6.598

Tables 1 and 2 show that white Democratic vote share has remained consistent over time, hovering around 41% year over year, yet Republicans have actually lost approximately 6% of the vote share to Independent identifying voters. For non-whites, the vote share has been heavily Democratic since 2004 and continued in this fashion to 2016. Non-white Republican vote share was at its lowest during the election of Obama's first term and has remained low ever since. The increase of Independent vote share over time among whites is a reflection of the growing resentment against the government and the two-party system, showcased by the works of Hochschild (2016). In general, both Tables 1 and 2 suggest that each election presents peculiarities that are unique to each campaign and context which cannot be captured by racial demographics alone.

Tables 3-5 investigate vote share of whites when controlled for education, income, and gender. Breaking down education into these four categories, whites with less than a HS diploma voted for Obama 64% of the time in 2008 and then rebound back to higher levels of Republican

votes in 2016, at 62.75%. Out of the first three tiers of education, less than HS educated whites were the only group to have a majority Democrat vote in 2008 for Obama. This could be due to the careful choices used by the Obama campaign in 2008, such as naming Senator Joe Biden as his Vice President, to appeal to these undereducated whites (Nelson, 2016). Another potential explanation is that less than HS educated whites did not perceive President Obama to be a status threat to their livelihood, rather, they viewed him as a mechanism of change, something his campaign specifically ran on (Nelson, 2016). Regardless, both are explanations that attribute unique candidate influences to variances in data, confirming the results of Tables 1 and 2.

Similarly, over time, whites who both completed high school and/ or some college remained majority Republican. However, college-educated whites were the only group to vote against Trump in 2016, giving the majority to the Democrats. These trends demonstrate the political phenomenon of "Democratic inversion." Traditionally, those with high education and high income tend to vote Republican, as an extensive list of literature documents (McCarty et al.; NW et al., 2014; NW et al., 2014). However, in recent years, those with a college degree or higher have flipped partisan identification and became majority Democrats in 2016, A main explanation for Democratic Inversion is that President Trump was a special candidate that used populist, quasi anti-democratic rhetoric that caused worry amongst scholars and, in turn, caused a partisan shift; candidate exceptionalism, therefore, is the best explanation to changing attitudes among education strata. Table 4 reports partisan identification by income level, measured in quartiles, for the 4 elections.

Education

Table 3

White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Education

		White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Education			
Type of Education	**Year**	**2004**	**2008**	**2012**	**2016**
Less than HS Diploma					
	Democrat	50	64.1	38.33	31.37
	Republican	50	34.4	58.33	62.75
	Other	N/A	1.56	3.33	5.88
High School Diploma					
	Democrat	37.79	48.9	40.7	32.34
	Republican	60.2	50.40	57.19	63.04
	Other	2.007	<1%	2.10	4.62
Some College					
	Democrat	36.84	44	39.5	29.46
	Republican	63.16	53.6	57.38	62.2
	Other	N/A	2.38	3.12	8.33
Bachelor's or Above					
	Democrat	43.33	48	46.39	50.57
	Republican	55.42	49	49.86	41.45
	Other	1.25	2.98	3.75	7.98

Income

Table 4

White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Income

		White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Income			
Quartile of Income	**Year**	**2004**	**2008**	**2012**	**2016**
1st Quartile					
	Democrat	38.85	54.2	46.47	34.558
	Republican	60.43	42.6	48.61	56.44
	Other	<1%	3.19	4.92	8.71
2nd Quartile					
	Democrat	50	52.7	38.28	38.17
	Republican	46.88	45.5	59.34	54.33
	Other	3.12	1.79	2.38	7.49
3rd Quartile					
	Democrat	39.35	45.5	39.89	38.16
	Republican	59.72	52.9	56.4	55.52
	Other	<1%	1.6	3.71	6.33
4th Quartile					
	Democrat	36.7	26.2	45.43	46.03
	Republican	58.87	73.8	52.28	45.88
	Other	2.41		2.28	8.08

Excluding the 2008 election, whites in the lowest quartile of income voted for the Republican candidate over time. However, the difference between party vote share remained low following the Obama election, as 2004 had the highest amount of Republican, poor white vote share. This suggests that the campaign rhetoric of the Obama administration potentially reached all poor Americans, rather than just poor minorities. However, after President Obama was introduced into office, the partisan flip along the poorest of whites could indicate that the saliency of race was increased, and in tandem, the issue of status threat became palpable among poor whites. In the second quartile, similarly, voters sided with the Republican candidate in 2012

and 2016, the only difference between the first two quartiles was a difference in the partisan majority in 2004. The highest 50% of income earners voted Republican across the board, except for the top 25% of income earners in 2016. This change of top income earners voting for Clinton in 2016 further confirms the 'Democratic Inversion' phenomenon. Personally, when both top education attainment and top income earners flipped partisan identification in 2016, I was shocked. However, this could suggest that the campaign tactics used by the Trump campaign were ineffective at convincing top education and income earners to maintain their Republican stance. I would argue that the exceptionalism of President Trump's incendiary and negatively oriented rhetoric disillusioned those at the top and they 'did not fall' for his campaign tricks.

Gender

Table 5

White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Gender

		White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Gender			
Gender	**Year**	**2004**	**2008**	**2012**	**2016**
Male					
	Democrat	37.41	43.5	39.77	36.83
	Republican	60.14	53.6	55.85	56
	Other	2.44	2.96	4.38	7.17
Female					
	Democrat	42.94	54.3	45.36	42.55
	Republican	56.47	47.3	52.66	49.67
	Other	<1%	1.41	1.98	7.79

Table 5 displays white vote choice by gender across the 4 elections and reports that white males voted Republican uniformly across the board. In fact, Democrat, white, male vote share has decreased from 2008, bottoming out in 2016 with a difference of ~7%. White females, similarly, tend to vote Republican after the 2008 election and maintained similar levels of

difference between political party vote share in 2012 and 2016. The spike in white female Democratic votes in 2008 suggests that President Obama being a minority potentially resonated with all minority demographics to some extent.

In a larger sense, the Republican party is becoming whiter, male, lower-income, and less educated over time. Conversely, the Democratic party is becoming more diverse, higher income, and more educated over the past 4 elections. These findings suggest that the Republican party's demographics have the potential to be more susceptible to racialized rhetoric and the elites who employ it, especially covert or implicit racial attitudes (White, 2007). In tandem, the presence of Democratic Inversion among top education and income respondents in 2016, I argue, is a response to President Trump's exceptionalism in 2016, specifically his overt racialized rhetoric and frequent extremist sympathy. The words and actions candidates say and do have a significant impact on vote choice and voting preferences. Specifically, it appears that if politicians choose to employ racialized rhetoric, Republican party identifiers appear more responsive to LGR attitudes activated and can be manipulated for partisan gain.

Section 4.2: White Affect and Polarization

Table 6 below displays the average feeling thermometer score of whites over the time series regarding the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates. A feeling thermometer is ranked along a 100-point scale, where a higher score indicates a higher degree of "warmness" towards the subject. In the case of this section, the means presented measure whites' general "warmness" to both presidential candidates.

Table 6

Means Comparison of Whites' Feeling Thermometers towards Presidential Candidates

	Year of Study			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Whites' Mean "Warmness" Score				
Republican Candidate	60.68 (33.67)	54.13 (25.59)	51.55 (29.85)	47.13 (35.12)
Democrat Candidate	50.68 (26.71)	55.51 (28.39)	48.98 (33.64)	37.17 (32.99)

NOTE: All responses displayed are controlled for white respondents. Standard deviation in parenthesis.

Over time, Whites view both parties with less warmth. The highest degree of 'warmth' captured by the feeling thermometer was in 2004 when President George W. Bush received a score of 60. This could be affected by other factors than simply race, such as his incumbency and response to domestic and foreign affairs that occurred in the early 2000s. However, Democratic candidates feeling thermometers demonstrate that whites became *colder* to Democrat candidates, especially Hillary Clinton in 2016, more so than Republican candidates. This indicates that even though Whites may not have necessarily voted more Republican over time, their attitudes towards Democratic presidential candidates have grown colder disproportionate to Republican candidates. Looking from a macro perspective, the growing coldness towards both parties, but overall higher warmth for the Republican party, among whites, suggests that a certain platform or policy position following 2008 caused an increase in white affect. I argue this is the presence of negative racialized campaign rhetoric, present in both Republican candidates in 2012 and 2016, increasing year after year (Nelson, 2016; Mason et al., 2021).

Table 7

Means comparison of whites' "closeness" to other whites, whites to blacks, and vice versa

	Year of Study			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Whites' "Warmness" to Whites	73.78 (19.15)	72.83 (19.42)	73.64 (18.1)	73.28 (18.54)
Whites' "Warmness" to Blacks	69.24 (18.43)	67.23 (19.5)	62.57 (20.85)	66.51 (20.34)
Blacks "Warmness" to Whites	72.66 (20.04)	75.76 (20.14)	69.98 (22.07)	65.87 (23.92)
Black "Warmness" to Blacks	87.05 (15.45)	85.79 (17.74)	84.86 (17.88)	83.96 (20.52)

NOTE: All responses displayed are controlled for white respondents. Standard deviation in parenthesis

Table 7 measures intragroup and intergroup attitudes of Blacks and Whites across the 4 elections. I measure these attitudes across these racial demographics to determine if there are significant changes between either type of attitude to better understand which has a stronger effect on presidential election preferences. Whites' feeling of closeness to other whites has remained steady over time, with less than a 1-point difference over 20 years. This suggests that neither the introduction of President Obama nor Trump necessarily impacted feelings of closeness among whites to a very significant level. Similarly, but to a higher degree, black warmness to other blacks remained very high throughout the time series. The 12-point difference in warmness between races is not shocking, in fact, these data points match my expectations for this table, as I expected blacks to have a higher degree of warmness to other blacks. As Knowles and Marshburn point out, minorities have had their identity 'welded' to their race, especially in an American setting, because of the legacy of discrimination and racism in the US' past and the community's response to it, culturally and socially (2010). This, in turn, reaffirms the disparity

between whites' and blacks' warmness towards themselves, as blacks have been forced to create a cultural identity surrounding their race, while whites have not necessarily had to (Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Kendi, 2016).

On the other hand, when comparing the warmness of whites and blacks towards their racial 'counterpart,' whites view blacks in a colder light than the other way around. This could imply that whites have always viewed minorities and 'others' with a certain degree of coldness. This is certainly the case pre-1960s, however, it may be the case in the present as well.

Table 8, below, reports one-tailed t-tests of mean attitudes of Democrats and Republicans towards their respective candidates over time. These tests are measuring which party, if any, is moving in a negative, polarized direction. When measuring attitudes of the Democratic candidate, the warmness of Democrat voters hovered within a 16-point range from 65 to 82, while Republican warmness towards the Democratic Candidates decreased significantly, from 37 in 2008 to 16.09 in 2016. This demonstrates that white Republican voters grew colder towards the Democratic party's candidate over time while Democrat warmth remained the same, potentially indicating increased polarization. Similarly, the t-test results display a growing gap between partisan attitudes towards presidential candidates, peaking in 2012, the second term of President Obama. This could be an indicator of race becoming increasingly salient when viewing the democratic candidate among white Republican voters because of the growing unease and resentment of poor whites, in addition to the introduction of Mitt Romney's racially implicit campaign.

Table 8

Means Comparison of white, in/out party "Warmness" towards Presidential Candidates

	Year of Study			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Dem. R towards Dem. Can	68.03	70.83	81.61	65.09
Repub. R towards Dem. Can	32.88	37.48	22.85	16.09
T-Test of Significance	**35.15*** (1.50)**	**33.36*** (1.35)**	**58.76*** (0.77)**	**49.0*** (0.98)**
Dem. R towards Repub. Can	32.71	40.48	25.71	19.87
Repub. R towards Repub. Can	81.76	70.46	75.10	69.20
T-Test of Significance	**-49.06*** (1.70)**	**-29.98*** (1.2)**	**-49.39*** (0.73)**	**-49.34*** (1.08)**

NOTE: For the purpose of clarity, third party respondents are converted to missing values to allow significance testing. The first t-test identifies the difference of means of white respondents towards the Dem. Candidate and is represented by the formula: diff = mean(Democrat R) – mean(Republican R). The second t-test identifies the difference of means of white respondents towards the Repub. Candidate and is represented by the same formula.
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

On both sides, oppositional presidential candidate warmness has decreased from 2004. In general, however, Democrat respondents showed *more* warmness towards their party compared to Republican respondents over time. Interestingly, white Republican respondents felt colder towards the rival presidential candidate during President Obama's administration than their democratic counterparts did towards the Republican candidates. This could indicate that racialized attitudes played a role in evaluating the likeability of President Obama but not in evaluating the warmness towards Mitt Romney.

But can this polarization be better understood from an in-party perspective? Table 8a. below measures attitudes of respondents within the *same* party towards partisan Presidential

candidates, rather than measuring bipartisan feelings of the same *presidential candidate*. The purpose of this table is to further illustrate that attitudes toward the same and opposing presidential candidate within the same political party voting bloc are growing farther apart. If this is the case, then the two t-tests of significance will reflect a growing divide between warmness towards the same party candidate and coldness towards the alternate party's candidate.

The table reports that the lowest amount of polarized warmness/ coldness between respondents occurred in the 2008 election. Republicans were warmest to the Democratic candidate in 2008, and conversely, Democrats were warmest to the Republican presidential candidate in '08 as well. This could be due, in part, to the exceptionalism of John McCain in 2008, who, instead of highlighting the differences of race between the candidates to win votes, championed President Obama's victory as an exceptional example of the American system of progress. This result further suggests that the unique character and actions of each candidate is a strong influence on partisan attitudes.

Following the '08 election, polarization increases to record levels. The significance tests between respondents' attitudes towards the same and different political party have widened to a concerning amount on both sides. Additionally, the averages of each significance test demonstrate that Republican respondents have grown more negative towards the other party and more positive towards their own party than their Democratic counterparts; the average of the t-test results for Democratic respondents is 42 while the average for Republican respondents is -47.

The Republican and Democrat parties are becoming increasingly polarized over time. The Republican party, which is growing whiter, male, and less educated/ lower income over time, is also growing further polarized than its counterparty. Among whites and blacks in

general, intra-group warmness remained consistent throughout the 4 elections, yet white intergroup warmness towards blacks was lowest during the Obama Administration, with a rebound of warmness in 2016. This suggests that the salience of President Obama's race and the careful activation mechanisms used by the Republican Party in 2012 had some effect on racial relations among whites in the U.S. Additionally, the rebound of white warmness towards Blacks following President Trump's election could suggest that President Trump acted as a sort of 'pressure release valve' of built-up racial resentment, and upon being elected, racially conscious whites felt as though their interests where once again being represented in the White House.

Table 8a.

Means comparison of white, same-party R with contending Presidential Candidates

	Year of Study			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Dem. R towards Dem. Can	68.03	70.83	81.61	65.09
Dem. R towards Repub. Can	32.7	40.48	25.71	19.87
T-Test of Significance	**35.32*** (1.76)**	**30.35*** (1.26)**	**55.89*** (0.74)**	**45.22*** (1.18)**
Repub. R towards Dem. Can	32.88	37.48	22.85	16.09
Repub. R towards Repub. Can	81.76	70.46	75.10	69.20
T-Test of Significance	**-48.88*** (1.45)**	**-32.98*** (1.29)**	**-52.25*** (0.84)**	**-53.12*** (0.9)**

NOTE: For the purpose of clarity, third party respondents are converted to missing values to allow significance testing. The first t-test identifies the difference of means of white *Democrat*-party respondents towards the two different party candidates and is represented by the formula: diff = mean(Democrat R -> Democrat Pres. Candidate) – mean(Democrat R -> Republican Pres. Candidate). The second t-test identifies the difference of means of white *Republican*-party respondents towards the two candidates and is represented by the formula mean(Repub R -> Democrat Pres. Candidate) – mean(Repub R -> Republican Pres. Candidate).
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Section 4.3: Independent Variable Testing

The final section concerns the testing of means of my four measures of LGR: Negative Stereotypes, Racial Resentment, Anti-Black affect, and White Identity. Table 9 reports the means of each concept of LGR among white respondents from 2004 – 2016. The table of every variable name in the original ANES datasets across the time series is listed in the footnotes[1].

Table 9

Mean responses of Whites across 4 dimensions of LGR

	Year of Survey			
Measured Concept	2004	2008	2012	2016
Negative Stereotypes[1]	6.77 (2.05)	6.42 (2.21)	6.67 (2.298)	7.17 (2.35)
Racial Resentment[2]	11.04 (3.81)	11.42 (3.65)	11.54 (3.796)	10.28 (4.52)
Antiblack Affect:[3]				
Influence of Blacks in Politics	N/A	2.25 (1.27)	2.88 (1.25)	2.45 (1.27)
White Identity	N/A	N/A	2.21 (0.89)	2.09 (0.94)
Government Assistance	4.82 (1.63)	4.99 (1.75)	5.24 (1.56)	4.76 (1.79)
N	608	823	2,332	2,096

NOTE: Stand-alone values are the means of each LGR concept. Standard Deviation is listed in parentheses.

Attitudes of negative stereotypes were strongest in the 2016 election and weakest in 2008. This indicates that whites generally ascribed to higher levels of negative stereotyping over time, and it appears that these findings suggest that in 2008, the rhetoric of John McCain did not activate any negative racial attitudes, and as such, intensities of explicit LGR attitudes would be

lower than other elections where racialized attitudes were activated. The racial resentment index variable demonstrates that levels of racial resentment among whites remained constant until 2016, when intensities are at their lowest. During the Obama administration, unlike negative stereotyping, racial resentment intensities were at their 'highest,' although the difference is marginal.

Anti-black affect remained low throughout all years. This first variable is an explicit measure of racial attitudes, and because of this, could reflect a value that is not necessarily reflective of true attitudes, due to whites not wanting to violate social norms of egalitarianism (Kinder and Sears, 1981). However, whites' belief that blacks should not receive any form of specialized assistance peaked during the Obama Administration, and, like racial resentment, was lowest in 2016. This suggests that whites' activation of racial attitudes depends on the unique circumstances of an election; more specifically, these results suggest that negative LGR attitudes are omnipresent throughout all 4 elections, yet specific candidate actions or special election circumstances are what activate them to become politically significant.

Section 4.4: Conclusion

In general, the White vote share for the past 20 years has been majority Republican, with a growing number of whites voting for independent third parties. Over time, the Republican party has become more white, less educated, lower-income earners, and male. The Democratic party, conversely, has become more diverse, with a growing number of top income earners and highly educated. The main interpretation of the data is that racial attitudes are enduring emotions that are present in every election. They continue to have some presence among voters throughout the 21st century, even if they do not peak in 2016 as I expected. This could indicate that race has

become a lens through which whites view issues, influencing white political behavior through racial spillover. Data from 2008 to 2016 for partisan vote choice could be influenced by the presence of this racial spillover.

Levels of whites' Presidential candidate affect have steadily decreased over time for both parties, in addition to an overall increase of Independent vote share over time; these results indicate that a growing number of whites are dissatisfied with the two-party system and there potentially is an increased presence of white originated political animus over time. Attitudes of respondents toward their party's Presidential opponent have grown colder across both parties over time, with Republicans growing generally colder than Democrats. Additionally, when comparing in-group attitudes of both parties' respondents towards Presidential candidates, increasing polarization becomes more apparent, as outgroup Presidential candidate affect has grown colder at a faster rate than in-group Presidential candidate affect. This indicates that party polarization has grown over the past 20 years and is most intense within the Republican party.

Four measures of Latter-generational Racism examine three conceptualizations of 'new' racism: explicit negative stereotyping, implicit racial resentment, and anti-black affect/ intragroup white identity. Generally, when comparing attitudinal averages across years, intensities of LGR attitudes do not peak in 2016, however, these results do suggest that LGR attitudes have remained present within the electorate from 2004-2016 at relatively similar levels. Because of this, it appears that the role of the candidate and their campaign is instrumental in activating racial attitudes for them to become politically significant.

Chapter 5: Multivariate Regression Analysis

This section estimates multi-variate regression models to evaluate the influence of the four measures of latter-generational discrimination on voters' perceptions of Presidential candidates over the past 20 years. I construct two models that regress respondents' closeness to the Presidential candidates on five LGR index variables, race, education, income, gender, partisan identification, marital status, and religiosity.

Before outlining the framework of the regression models, a cause of concern is the potentiality of multi-collinearity for each of the four independent variables. It may be hard to definitively decide which independent variable impacts the data uniquely. Due to this, this section administers a correlation matrix. If the correlation matrices produce a value of 0.75 or above, then multicollinearity is likely present.

In 2004, 2008, and 2012, none of the four independent variables being tested resulted in a correlation variable above a 0.55, 0.49, and 0.59, respectively. The highest values of these three years were between racial resentment and anti-black affect. In 2016, the correlation variable between ABA and RR is 0.66 for a regular correlation matrix. All other values fell below the threshold. This suggests that any regression models using these variables will not be affected by multi-collinearity and every variable will be ran together in the models. All multi-collinearity matrices are included in the footnotes[5].

Section 5.2: Republican Presidential Candidate Affect Regression Model

Each regression model includes all 4 measures of LGR and traditional control variables to understand their impact on Presidential candidate affect from 2004-2012. The control variables that are used for the following models are standard demographic indicators[6]. Each are included to determine the impact of the four independent measures of LGR when traditional indicators of vote choice are held constant. Table 10 reports the first model, which regresses respondent closeness to the Republican Presidential candidate on LGR index variables, race, and demographic controls. Race is encoded as a dummy variable where Black is the excluded condition. This dummy variable captures the effect of being white on Republican candidate preferences.

There are four major conclusions that emerge from the results. First, across most of the 20 years, implicit LGR attitudes are present and significant among voters. As attitudes of resentment rise, general affect for the Republican Presidential candidate increases, with the highest intensity being in 2016. Anti-black affect also positively influences Republican candidate affect across the board except for the variable measuring self-held perceptions of specialized aid to blacks in 2016. Surprisingly, in both 2004 and 2008, resentment and anti-black affect had more of an influence in Republican presidential candidate likeness than income, education level, and gender. In tandem, both measures of LGR suggest that racialized attitudes do have an impact on the warmness respondents feel towards the Republican candidate and LGR attitudes are influential in political preferences.

Table 10

Multi-variate Regression: LGR attitudes on Republican Candidate Warmness across Full Sample

	Republican Presidential Candidate Feeling Thermometer			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Negative Stereotypes (Index variable)	-0.55 (0.32)	0.35 (0.28)	-0.52* (0.2)	0.01 (0.2)
Racial Resentment (Index variable)	1.00*** (0.29)	0.41* (0.21)	1.44*** (0.15)	1.93*** (0.15)
Anti-Black Affect (black influence)	N/A	1.71** (0.56)	3.54*** (0.41)	2.35*** (0.42)
White Identity (white discrimination)	N/A	N/A	0.42 (0.52)	1.77*** (0.5)
Anti-Black Affect (Self aid to blck scale)	3.20*** (0.65)	1.1** (0.40)	2.31*** (0.34)	0.58 (0.32)
Race	-5.76* (2.91)	4.44* (1.71)	7.00*** (1.32)	2.96** (1.1)
Income	-0.28 (0.78)	-0.15 (0.79)	-0.44 (0.44)	-1.58*** (0.37)
Education Level	-1.63 (0.99)	0.60 (0.73)	1.42** (0.52)	-2.88*** (0.55)
Gender	-1.13 (1.92)	-1.11 (1.33)	1.64 (0.90)	-2.31** (0.89)
Partisan ID	42.83*** (2.12)	24.65*** (1.56)	10.37*** (0.67)	34.01*** (1.15)
Religiosity	-2.34*** (0.7)	-1.94*** (0.5)	-2.90*** (0.31)	-1.33*** (0.3)
Marital Status	-0.69 (0.55)	-0.33 (0.39)	-0.99*** (0.23)	-0.42 (0.23)
cons	22.17 (54.77)	8.39 (24.30)	-2.7 (3.21)	147.35*** (26.30)
N	665	1,162	3,015	2,556
Adjusted R-Squared	0.57	0.37	0.40	0.61

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<=.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Includes all R's as race is used as a control.

Second, the explicit measurement of negative stereotypes does little to influence Republican affect. It appears that the only significant relationship demonstrated was negatively oriented in 2012, meaning the belief in negative stereotypes *decreased* Republican candidate affect in 2012. This is an interesting finding which challenges my initial expectations. A plausible explanation to this is the explicit nature of the questions being asked. Because whites will go to great lengths to avoid violating the egalitarian norms in the US, perhaps respondents felt as though their response to explicit measures of racial attitudes would be judged (Kinder and Sears, 1981). The lack of influence negative stereotypes has on Republican candidate affect was most surprising in 2016 since President Trump effectively utilized these stereotypes to activate some whites' animus (Mason et al., 2021) and win the election. Nonetheless, the lack of influence negative stereotyping holds over respondent affect for Republican presidential candidates signals that explicit measures of racial attitudes may no longer be effective measures of racist attitudes.

Third, the positive relationship between white identity and Republican presidential candidate affect demonstrates that Donald Trump effectively targeted these attitudes and activated them, increasing overall warmness. The presence of President Trump's rhetoric, I'd argue, reignited feelings of status threat to a degree significant enough to influence whites' perception of the Republican candidate and reinforces the premise that the identity of whiteness is becoming increasingly salient among white voters, and in turn, is being utilized by the Republican party to win the presidency (Tesler, 2012; Hochschild, 2016; Sides et al., 2018; Mason et al., 2021).

It appears, in general that the intensity of these attitudes depends on the individual politician and their choice to activate them through rhetoric. The unique activation of resentment

and white identity by President Trump was very explicit compared to previous elections when the Republican party's front runner dissuaded any activation mechanisms of negative racial sensitivity. When race was not a salient issue, like in 2004, racial attitudes may have influenced Republican candidate perceptions in the model, however, the large, significant coefficient of partisan identification, along with a lack of significant controls, may indicate that other issues outside of the model may have had a greater effect. This suggests that race is a deep cleavage in the United States, regardless of more pressing domestic and foreign issues.

The variable measuring race, specifically the role of whiteness, produces the most interesting results over time. From 2008 to 2016, being white increased a respondents' warmness to Republican candidates, with the highest impact occurring during President Obama's term (coefficients of 4.44 and 7). This suggests that whites are more likely to have warmer attitudes towards Republican presidential candidates following the introduction of President Obama in 2008. In 2004, however, the relationship was negative and being white *decreased* a respondent's warmness towards a Republican candidate. This could be explained by international affairs such as Iraq affecting public perceptions. White respondents may have become disaffected with the Bush Administration's actions throughout the Iraq War and have little to do with race itself.

The findings in Table 10 imply that more intense LGR attitudes of respondents, regardless of their own race, have a demonstrated positive relationship with Republican presidential candidate affect over time. These models, however, do not capture whether there is an interactive relationship between race and negative attitudes. Due to this, I construct interaction terms between the race dummy variable and each LGR variable. The resulting 5 interaction variables are included, labeled numerically in ascending order, with the complete model presented in Appendix A. However, including all interaction variables produces unclear

results. For example, racial resentment stayed positively significant in 2012 and 2016, however, its interaction variable displayed significance only in 2016, and the individual variable lost its significance in 2004/ 2008. Likewise, most individual LGR and control variables lost their significance within certain years, contradicting the previous models.

Because of this, I construct a model of best fit by selectively including certain interaction terms that demonstrate significance from Appendix A. Due to a lack of ANES questions measuring certain LGR attitudes prior to 2012, I condense two separate models of best fit into Table 11, split between 2004-2008 and 2012-2016. For the first two years, I include interaction variables 1, negative stereotyping, and 3, perceptions of black influence in politics (ABA #3), while the latter two years use interaction variables 2, racial resentment, and 4, white identity. I expect to find the interaction variables will be statistically significant and produce positive coefficients.

Table 11

Multi-Variate Regression: Model of Best Fit

	Republican Presidential Candidate Feeling Thermometer			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Negative Stereotypes (Index variable)	-1.05 (0.7)	1.06* (0.46)	-0.53** (0.20)	0.00 (0.19)
Racial Resentment (Index variable)	0.99*** (0.29)	0.43* (0.21)	0.89*** (0.27)	1.55*** (0.22)
Anti-Black Affect (black influence)	N/A	4.64*** (1.22)	3.43*** (0.41)	2.36*** (0.41)
White Identity (white discrimination)	N/A	N/A	2.12* (0.97)	-0.76 (0.91)
Anti-Black Affect (Self-place aid to blacks scale)	3.16*** (0.65)	1.14** (0.39)	2.28*** (0.34)	0.52 (0.32)
Interaction 1: (race x NS)	0.63 (0.8)	-1.04 (0.57)	N/A	N/A
Interaction 2: (race x RR)	N/A	N/A	0.74* (0.30)	0.5* (0.23)
Interaction 3: (race x ABA1)	N/A	-3.64** (1.36)	N/A	N/A
Interaction 4: (race x Wht Iden)	N/A	N/A	-2.36* (1.14)	3.47*** (1.08)
Race	-10.9 (7.13)	16.05*** (4.31)	5.80 (3.19)	-7.70** (2.69)
Income	-0.27 (0.78)	0.05 (0.79)	-0.48 (0.44)	-1.56*** (0.36)
Education Level	-1.64 (0.99)	0.61 (0.73)	1.46** (0.52)	-2.99*** (0.55)
Gender	-1.07 (1.92)	-1.36 (1.33)	1.76 (0.90)	-2.45** (0.90)

Partisan ID	42.77*** (2.12)	25.17*** (1.56)	10.26*** (0.69)	33.80*** (1.14)
Religiosity	-2.33*** (0.7)	-1.99*** (0.5)	-2.89*** (0.31)	-1.26*** (0.30)
Marital Status	-0.7 (0.55)	-0.33 (0.39)	-0.98*** (0.23)	-0.45 (0.23)
cons	25.92 (55)	-6.52 (24.69)	-1.76 (3.88)	156.42*** (26.36)
N	665	1,162	3.015	2,556
Adjusted R-Squared	0.57	0.37	0.4	0.61

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<=.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Includes all R's as race is used as a control.

There are consistent results across all 3 models. Variables measuring racial resentment and anti-black affect (ABA) through perceptions of blacks in politics regardless of race, positively influence a respondent's Republican Presidential candidate affect every election year. Interestingly, negative stereotyping did influence Republican Presidential candidate affect in 2008 and 2012, but negatively in the latter election. Additionally, I expected race to be somewhat insignificant in 2004 because of an overall lack of racial issues being salient during the time of the campaigns, however, race being an insignificant influence on Republican candidate warmness in 2012 is surprising. This result indicates that presidential candidate preference towards Mitt Romney was not necessarily influenced by being white, however, it was positively influenced by harboring negative racial attitudes.

In 2012, the original measure of white identity reports a positive relationship, while the interaction is negative. It appears that stronger attitudes of white identity, regardless of race, did influence respondent warmness towards the Republican candidate in 2012, however, higher

intensities of white identity among whites created distance between racial sensitive whites and the Republican candidate in 2012. One potential explanation could be the increase in feelings of status threat among whites generated through Mitt Romney's immigration stance in 2012.

White identity reports the largest significant coefficient out of all interaction terms in 2016, suggesting that President Trump completely reversed the relationship between white identity attitudes and Republican candidate affect in 4 years. This is a troubling finding because it implies that if candidates can effectively utilize racially coded language to evoke whites racialized attitudes, it may not be a phenomenon exclusive to President Trump.

The final measure of anti-black affect, the extent to which respondents' feels the government ought to offer specialized assistance to blacks, was significant as an individual variable from 2004 to 2012, yielding a positive coefficient. Its interaction term was omitted due to insignificance. This suggests that before and during President Obama's administration, anti-black affect correlates to a higher degree of Republican candidate warmth. The presence of Obama in the White House, as an incumbent, in addition to the racialized campaign rhetoric of Mitt Romney, reignited significant anti-black affect which may be further explained by the phenomenon of racial spillover (Tesler, 2012).

However, turning attention to race shows that being white had a negative influence on respondent's Republican candidate affect, regardless of racial attitudes in 2016. A negative relationship between race and candidate warmness, yet positive relationship with white-interacted LGR variables shows conflicting results. These results reinforce the idea that President Trump selectively targeted racially sensitive whites during his campaign in 2016 and was able to mobilize them for political gain. He was not able to use racial rhetoric to mobilize all white

voters, in fact, the results suggest that whites who do not possess negative racial attitudes actively distanced themselves from President Trump and the Republican party in 2016.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This research examines continuity and change of latter-generational racial attitudes from 2004 – 2016, the effect of four LGR dimensions on voters' presidential candidate perceptions, and the interaction of whiteness on these attitudes. Using multi-variate regression models, I examine how race and intensities of LGR attitudes including negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity impact voter's Presidential candidate perceptions in the 21st century. My first and second hypotheses are partially rejected because *all* dimensions of LGR do not become more intense over time nor do they *all* influence Republican candidate affect. Negative stereotyping, anti-black affect measure #1 (influence of blacks in politics), and anti-black affect #3 (self-aid to black's scale) did not become more intense by 2016. In fact, both anti-black affect variables suggest that attitudes of anti-black affect become less intense over time. However, my results do demonstrate that certain LGR attitudes, specifically racial resentment, and white identity, build in intensity and significance throughout the series, culminating in 2016. These attitudes are strongest in 2016 because President Trump directly targeted and activated attitudes of political animus and white status threat during his campaign. In general, my findings demonstrate that most LGR attitudes, excluding negative stereotyping, have a positive relationship on respondent's Republican Presidential candidate affect.

With the Republican party becoming more white, male, and less educated, whiteness increasingly influenced Republican candidate affect during the elections of Obama and Trump, suggesting that the influence and strength of race depends partially upon candidate's choices to target the cleavage. My final hypothesis, that LGR attitudes are strongest among white voters

across time, especially during the Obama Administration, is rejected. Interaction terms report that white LGR attitudes become increasingly significant over time, peaking in 2016 with the white identity interaction variable; the original LGR index variables, however, demonstrate more widespread significance across both years and conceptual dimensions.

What are the implications of these results for the US and what can be done? In general, the results suggest that race continues to be a deep cleavage within society that has direct influence on political preferences. Polarization trends, racial out-group coldness, and LGR attitude intensities peak in similar election years. In tandem, the increasing racial homogeneity of the Republican party and growing racial diversity of the Democrat party over time indicate that race is and will continue to be a main contributor to the growing polarization trends of American government. Additionally, racial sensitivity (LGR attitudes) is based upon emotions, specifically resentment and affect. These attitudes are always present among the electorate, waiting to be activated. This is a worrisome finding because it indicates that any ambitious politician, such as President Trump, can use racialized campaign rhetoric and activate underlying racial sensitivity among the electorate to increase political appeal. If politicians choose to use racial attitudes as a political tool, it comes at the cost of further dividing the electorate.

The most important takeaway from this research is that the continual and increasing frequency Republican candidates activate LGR attitudes is a potential threat to democracy and its norms in the United States. When Republicans continually use activated racial attitudes to gain political power, they are using anti-pluralist practices that selectively target and potentially exclude minorities from having an equal political voice. Discounting political participation from minorities as unequal or unjust does not further democratic pluralism, where competing interests all receive equal recognition and representation within government. Additionally, invoking racial

rhetoric lowers racial tolerance among party members and alienates entire demographics of voters, specifically minorities. Both norms are fundamental to a healthy democracy. Finally, deep identity cleavages like race are most appealing to populist and anti-democratic leaders because they fuel intense polarization that can freeze democracies. If ambitious anti-democratic politicians are able to effectively activate racial cleavages for political gain, like what has been done in the past, the consequences could be troublesome for American democracy.

One last implication of these findings is that new waves of political decisions occurring on behalf of the Republican party, seen through legislation as the "Anti-Critical Race Theory Bill" and "Don't Say Gay Bill" in Florida under Governor DeSantis, could be an attempt to further homogenize the Republican party along racial lines and appeal to the growing racially sensitive radical base. Often referred to as the new 'Culture War,' the growing attacks against groups of people Republicans deem as "others" through legislation, court cases, or media discourse could be driven by these trends and fueled by this cleavage. If this assumption is correct, the erosion of democratic norms by Republican politicians is intentional, a worrisome conclusion for the current state of American democracy.

But there is hope. Despite negative racial attitudes being present and influential in every election, they were only politically salient *when activated*. This means that a return to democratic tolerance is possible if we discover a way to properly honor and bury the weapon of race. It seems turning a color-blind eye has not worked, nor has digging back up racial divides and reigniting a grim past. I believe that the best way forward is a renewed commitment from the American people to rectify the injustices of our past by refusing to open our democracy to any politicians who do not support principles of equality, inclusivity, and pluralism. Although racism

may never disappear from the U.S., refusing to give it any political power is a vital first step in fixing a wound that has long divided our nation.

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1993). Rational Choice and Turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*, *37*(1), 246–278. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111531

Alexander, M. (2012). *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (Rev. ed.). New Press. http://ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=489643&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Axt, J. R. (2018). The Best Way to Measure Explicit Racial Attitudes Is to Ask About Them. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *9*(8), 896–906. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617728995

Bernstein, M. (2005). Identity Politics. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *31*, 47–74. JSTOR.

Block, R. (2019). *Racial Stereotyping in Political Decision Making*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.967

Bobo, D. O. S. J. S. L., Sears, P. P. P. S. D. I. S. S. R. D. O., Sears, D. O., Sidanius, J., Sidanius, J., & Bobo, L. (2000). *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*. University of Chicago Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=zoHbVRqlRiIC

Brown, F. (2004). Nixon's "Southern Strategy" and Forces against Brown. *The Journal of Negro Education*, *73*(3), 191–208. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/4129605

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American Voter* (pp. viii, 573). John Wiley.

Cramer, K. (2017). The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *81*(2), 599–602. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx012

Cramer, K. (2020). Understanding the Role of Racism in Contemporary US Public Opinion. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *23*(1), 153–169. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060418-042842

Gilens, M. (2009). *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy*. University of Chicago Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=QORW1i6XDKgC

Hasso, F. S., & Gilens, M. (1999). Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. *Antioch Review*, *58*, 246.

Hochschild, A. R. (2016). *Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American right*. /z-wcorg/.

Jardina, A. (2019). *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge Core. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157

Kendi, I. X. (2016). *Stamped from the beginning: The definitive history of racist ideas in America*. /z-wcorg/.

Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. (1996). *Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals.* (pp. xi, 391). University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). *Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life*. 18.

Knowles, E. D., & Marshburn, C. K. (2010). Understanding White Identity Politics Will Be Crucial to Diversity Science. *Psychological Inquiry*, *21*(2), 134–139. JSTOR.

Knuckey, J. (2012). The “Palin Effect” in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election. *Political Research Quarterly*, *65*(2), 275–289. JSTOR.

Krysan, M., & Moberg, S. (2021, April) "*Tracking trends in racial attitudes,*" Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois System, retrieved from https://igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/racial_attitudes_2021.

Ladd, E. C. (1976). Liberalism Upside Down: The Inversion of the New Deal Order. *Political Science Quarterly*, *91*(4), 577–600. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2148795

Lublin, D., & Voss, D. S. (1998). The Partisan Impact of Voting Rights Law: A Reply to Pamela S. Karlan. *Stanford Law Review*, *50*(3), 765–777. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/1229323

MASON, L., WRONSKI, J., & KANE, J. V. (2021). Activating Animus: The Uniquely Social Roots of Trump Support. *American Political Science Review*, 1–9. Cambridge Core. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000563

McCarty, N. M., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2003). Political Polarization and Income Inequality. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1154098

McConahay, J. B., & Hough Jr., J. C. (1976). Symbolic Racism. *Journal of Social Issues*, *32*(2), 23–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1976.tb02493.x

McIlwain, C. D., & Caliendo, S. M. (2014). Mitt Romney's Racist Appeals: How Race Was Played in the 2012 Presidential Election. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *58*(9), 1157–1168. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764213506212

N, P, & R. (2008, November 5). Transcript Of John McCain's Concession Speech. *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96631784

Nelson, M. (2016, October 4). *Barack Obama: Campaigns and Elections | Miller Center*. https://millercenter.org/president/obama/campaigns-and-elections

NW, 1615 L. St, Washington, S. 800, & Inquiries, D. 20036 U.-419-4300 | M.-857-8562 | F.-419-4372 | M. (2003, November 5). The 2004 Political Landscape. *Pew Research Center - U.S.*

Politics & Policy. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2003/11/05/the-2004-political-landscape/

NW, 1615 L. St, Washington, S. 800, & Inquiries, D. 20036 U.-419-4300 | M.-857-8562 | F.-419-4372 | M. (2015a, April 7). 2014 Party Identification Detailed Tables. *Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy*. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/04/07/2014-party-identification-detailed-tables/

NW, 1615 L. St, Washington, S. 800, & Inquiries, D. 20036 U.-419-4300 | M.-857-8562 | F.-419-4372 | M. (2015b, April 7). A Deep Dive Into Party Affiliation. *Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy*. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-party-affiliation/

Peffley, M., Hurwitz, J., & Sniderman, P. M. (1997). Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime. *American Journal of Political Science*, *41*(1), 30–60. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111708

Reny, T. T., & Sears, D. O. (2020). Symbolic politics and self-interest in post-Affordable Care Act health Insurance coverage. *Research & Politics*, *7*(3), 205316802095510. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020955108

Ryan, A. (n.d.). *Grading the Presidents on Race*. POLITICO Magazine. Retrieved March 24, 2022, from https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/grading-the-presidents-on-race-115639

Sears, D. O. (1993). Symbolic Politics: In S. Iyengar & W. J. McGuire (Eds.), *Explorations in Political Psychology* (pp. 113–149). Duke University Press; JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv11cw16r.11

Sears, D. O., Van Laar, C., Carrillo, M., & Kosterman, R. (1997). Is It Really Racism?: The Origins of White Americans' Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *61*(1), 16–53. JSTOR.

Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). *Identity Crisis*. Princeton University Press; JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc77mmb

Sniderman, P. (1991). Race and Inequality: A Study in American Values. *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, *11*(3), 183–183. https://doi.org/10.1177/027046769101100331

Sniderman, P. M., & Carmines, E. G. (1997). Reaching beyond Race. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, *30*(3), 466–471. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/420124

Sniderman, P. M., Piazza, T., Tetlock, P. E., & Kendrick, A. (1991). The New Racism. *American Journal of Political Science*, *35*(2), 423–447. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111369

Sniderman, P. M., & Tetlock, P. E. (1986). Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis. *Journal of Social Issues*, *42*(2), 129–150. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1986.tb00229.x

Stephanopoulos, N. O. (2014). The South After Shelby County. *The Supreme Court Review*, *2013*(1), 55–134. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.1086/675346

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2004). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In J. T. Jost & J. Sidanius (Eds.), *Political Psychology* (0 ed., pp. 276–293). Psychology Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203505984-16

Tesler, M. (2012). The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race. *American Journal of Political Science*, *56*(3), 690–704. JSTOR.

Tesler, M. (2016). *Post-Racial or Most-Racial?: Race and Politics in the Obama Era*. University of Chicago Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=GWmkCwAAQBAJ

Turner, J. (2008). American Individualism and Structural Injustice: Tocqueville, Gender, and Race. *Polity*, *40*(2), 197–215. JSTOR.

Virtanen, S. V., & Huddy, L. (1998). Old-Fashioned Racism and New Forms of Racial Prejudice. *The Journal of Politics*, *60*(2), 311–332. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2647911

White, I. K. (2007). When Race Matters and When It Doesn't: Racial Group Differences in Response to Racial Cues. *The American Political Science Review*, *101*(2), 339–354. JSTOR.

Wing, B. (2012). *Race and Election 2004*. Race, Racism and the Law. https://racism.org/articles/basic-needs/protestprotection/1203-politics02-1

Appendix A

Multi-variate Regression: Republican Presidential Candidate Warmness on LGR, Controls, Interaction Terms

	Republican Presidential Candidate Feeling Thermometer			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Negative Stereotypes (Index variable)	-0.96 (0.71)	1.07* (0.46)	-0.07 (0.38)	0.27 (0.35)
Racial Resentment (Index variable)	0.86 (0.64)	0.45 (0.35)	1.05*** (0.29)	1.55*** (0.26)
Anti-Black Affect (black influence)	N/A	4.64*** (1.23)	1.57 (0.92)	2.01* (0.82)
White Identity (white discrimination)	N/A	N/A	2.40* (0.98)	-0.67 (0.92)
Anti-Black Affect (Self-place aid to blacks scale)	4.98*** (1.17)	0.99 (0.61)	1.61** (0.56)	0.43 (0.53)
Interaction 1: (race x NS)	0.60 (0.79)	-1.06 (0.58)	-0.69 (0.45)	-0.4 (0.43)
Interaction 2: (race x RR)	0.26 (0.71)	-0.04 (0.43)	0.48 (0.34)	0.49 (0.31)
Interaction 3: (race x ABA1)	N/A	-3.64** (1.38)	2.35* (1.03)	0.46 (0.94)
Interaction 4: (race x ABA2)	N/A	N/A	-2.72* (1.16)	3.37** (1.09)
Interaction 5: (race x ABA3)	-2.61 (1.39)	0.25 (0.8)	0.98 (0.70)	0.14 (0.66)
Race	-3.7 (9.30)	15.58** (5.33)	4.14 (4.17)	-6.19 (3.63)
Income	-0.28 (0.78)	0.06 (0.79)	-0.49 (0.44)	-1.57*** (0.37)

Education Level	-1.65 (0.99)	0.61 (0.73)	1.43** (0.52)	-2.98*** (0.55)
Gender	-1.16 (1.92)	-1.36 (1.33)	1.69 (0.90)	-2.45** (0.89)
Partisan ID	43.16*** (2.14)	25.1*** (1.58)	10.17*** (0.70)	33.8*** (1.15)
Religiosity	-2.33*** (0.7)	-2*** (0.5)	-2.84*** (0.31)	-1.26*** (0.29)
Marital Status	-0.71 (0.55)	-0.33 (0.39)	-0.97*** (0.23)	-0.45* (0.23)
cons	21.19 (55.31)	-6.27 (24.83)	0.01 (4.38)	156.32*** (26.37)
N	665	1,162	3,015	2,556
Adjusted R-Squared	0.57	0.37	0.40	0.61

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<=.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Includes all respondents as race is used as a control.

Endnotes

[1]The language of each individual question that comprises the index variable measuring negative stereotypes are listed below.

1. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates unintelligent, 7 means intelligent, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)

2. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates hard working, 7 means lazy, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)

3. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates peaceful, 7 means violent, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)

Respondent data for question 1 is only available in pre- 2012 data, all datasets contain question 2, and question 3 is considered for 2016. Four index variables, one per election year studied, are created using a uniform variable of perceptions about black work ethic, while the other variable in each index is constructed from the question available during that year. All original variables are ranked along a 7-point scale where a value of 1 indicates positive group racial attitudes and 7 indicates highly negative group racial attitudes. The constructed index variable is reduced for uniformity to a scale of 1 to 13, where 13 indicates high negative group racial attitudes.

[2]The index variable of racial resentment is derived from Kinder and Sanders' racial resentment scale which is a set of four questions where higher values indicate greater attitudes of racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders, 1981). The questions are:

1. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

4. It's really a matter of some people just not trying hard enough: if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Because higher values of the index variable indicate greater resentment, the polarity of questions 1 and 4 of the battery are reversed. All individual variables were recoded to reject missing values and the indexed variable was recoded to reflect a range of 1 to 17.

[3]The questions for each individual variable for white identity is below:

Q1, Black influence: Would you say that blacks have too much influence in American politics, just about the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little influence in American politics?

Q2, White Discrimination: How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? Whites

Q3, Government Assistance: Where would you place yourself on this scale? From 1-7, either the government should help blacks, or blacks should help themselves?

The first variable measuring white perceptions of black influence is along a 5-point scale where the lower value indicates there's not enough influence and a higher value indicates that there is too much influence in American politics. The data's responses were flipped in polarity to reflect a higher value representing higher levels of anti-black affect. *NOTE: Data for Question #1 is not available in 2004.*

The second question is ranked along a 5-point scale where a higher value represents greater levels of white identity. *NOTE: Data for question #2 is not available in 2004 and 2008.*

The final question is ranked along a 7-point scale and measures where the respondent would rate how they feel personally about specialized governmental assistance to blacks. Higher values indicate a higher level of white identity.

[4] **Table V**

Variable names, by concept by year

	Year of Survey			
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Measured Concept				
Negative Stereotypes	1. V045227 2. V045223 3. N/A	1. V085175b 2. V085174b 3. N/A	1. stype_intblack 2.stype_hwkblack 3. N/A	1. N/A 2. V162346 3. V162350
Racial Resentment	V045193 V045194 V045195 V045196	V085143-6	Resent_ > Workway Slavery Deserve Try	V162212-4
Antiblack effect	1. N/A 2. N/A 3. V043158	1. V085114 2. N/A 3. V083137	1. racecasi_infblacks 2. discrim_whites 3. aidblack_self	1. V162323 2. V162360 3. V161198
Dependent Variable				
Repub Candidate Feeling Thermometer	V045043	V085063c	ft_rpc	V161087

[5]All multicollinearity matrices are listed below, by year.

2004-

	Negative Stereotypes	Racial Resentment	ABA1 (black influence in politics)	ABA2 (white identity)	ABA3 (Self-Aid to Blacks)
NS	1.00	-	-	-	-
RR	0.26	1.00	-	-	-
ABA1	X	x	X	-	-
ABA2	x	x	X	X	-
ABA3	0.25	0.55	x	x	1.00

2008-

	Negative Stereotypes	Racial Resentment	ABA1 (black influence in politics)	ABA2 (white identity)	ABA3 (Self-Aid to Blacks)
NS	1.00	-	-	-	-
RR	0.26	1.00	-	-	-
ABA1	0.10	0.37	1.00	-	-
ABA2	x	x	X	X	-
ABA3	0.25	0.55	0.26	x	1.00

2012-

	Negative Stereotypes	Racial Resentment	ABA1 (black influence in politics)	ABA2 (white identity)	ABA3 (Self-Aid to Blacks)
NS	1.00	-	-	-	-
RR	0.26	1.00	-	-	-
ABA1	0.25	0.46	1.00	-	-
ABA2	0.10	0.25	0.26	1.00	-
ABA3	0.25	0.55	0.36	0.17	1.00

2016-

	Negative Stereotypes	Racial Resentment	ABA1 (black influence in politics)	ABA2 (white identity)	ABA3 (Self-Aid to Blacks)
NS	1.00	-	-	-	-
RR	0.38	1.00	-	-	-
ABA1	0.2	0.52	1.00	-	-
ABA2	0.14	0.31	0.28	1.00	-
ABA3	0.31	0.66	0.42	0.25	1.00

[6]The formation and operationalization of the control variables are discussed here. To begin, education, income, and gender are operationalized in the same format as the descriptive statistics section. Education is split amongst four categories, ranging from no HS diploma to Bachelor's or Higher. Income is split along four major quartiles, and gender is contained to a dummy variable of male or female. NOTE: Third gender options are omitted since they were only present in the 2016 ANES survey and contained an N response of '13.' Marital status is correlated along single, married, divorced, or widowed across the time series. Finally, religiosity is measured in 2004-2008 through the number of times a respondent prays throughout the week, from never to multiple times a day. In 2012, a question administered by the ANES asked respondents about the importance of religion to their identity. The response options are coded from extremely important having a value of '1' and not at all important having a value of '5.' The polarity of this question is in the same direction as the others used to measure religiosity in 2004-2008. In 2016, the measure of religiosity is done through religious service attendance, ranging from never to every week.